Introduction
The Italian Minister of International Cooperation and Integration, Professor Andrea Riccardi, recently declared that Italian legislation on immigration should address the problem of citizenship for immigrants in a new and positive ways. According to his thinking, Italy should go beyond the two alternative paradigms of ius sanguinis -which accords the citizenship only to those who are of Italian descent -or ius soli -which accords the citizenship only to those who were born in Italy.
We should instead reach a broader, more refined and realistic conception of the right to citizenship as a sort of ius culturae. 2 Min. Riccardi suggests that we are Italian because we share our life, culture, lifestyle and values with the people of our country. So immigrants should be accorded citizenship with the same logic: they should become Italian -or be considered as Italian -since they share their lifestyle, values and culture with Italians.
Mr. Riccardi"s statement has been almost immediately forgotten. After all, he is a member of a openly interim government, which has very different priorities, focusing on the financial crisis.
Moreover, the dichotomy between ius sanguinis and ius soli is more nuanced than how it is usually depicted: immigrants already can become Italian, after quite a long period of legal residency in Italy (usually 10 years). 3 Finally, it is not so clear how the ius culturae criteria could be applied: how could one measure the level of cultural integration of an immigrant?
Notwithstanding all these problematic aspects of the idea of a ius culturae, it must be recognized that Mr. Riccardi has pointed the finger to a longstanding issue about immigration, integration and citizenship -an issue that has several counterparts in other European states, too.
In fact, vast parts of Europe are struggling with the question of what transforms an immigrant into a
1 Lecture in Public Comparative Law, University of Padua. Visiting Scholar at Notre Dame University, Center for Civil and Human Rights, and Senior Fellow at Emory University, Center for the Study of Law and Religion. I am immensely grateful to Paolo Carozza for his invitation to participate in the activities of his Center, even if only briefly. I am deeply grateful also to Marta Cartabia, Andrea Simoncini, Erik Longo, Donald Kommers, for their comments at the Faculty colloquium that originated the paper. I am especially thankful to Christine Cervenak, whose support, encouragement, comments and help were so important. This work is in loving memory of Alessandra Pastorino Epidendio: her earthly life was helpful for many of us, up to its very end. I welcome comments: please address them to andrea.pin@unipd.it. 2 http://www.andreariccardi.it/it/rassegna-stampa/cittadinanza-riccardi-ius-culturae-e-la-chiave-. others focus on the criteria that should inform citizenship rights policies (such as Germany); 14 and others consider the tools that are needed to erase cultural conflicts among social groups, regardless of their citizenship status (Spain, for instance). Some countries highlight the roots -and therefore the past -that their citizens share, in order to provide noncitizens with a clear idea of the mindset that they are expected to embrace (Italy or Germany); 15 others envisage a new compact or mindset for everyone, and therefore focus on the future (Spain). These details make a lot of difference. They demonstrate that there is a distinction between the countries that focus on the past, which is usually reflected in the ius sanguinis criteria, and the countries that are most concerned with the futuretypically, the ius soli perspective. The former assumes that children of native-born citizens are good citizens and that their values must be instilled in newcomers: this is why the past of a country matters so much. The latter believe that immigration, among other factors, forces domestic institutions to frame a new compact for everybody: this is why such strand of thinking is most concerned with giving a common future for all the people, regardless of their origins.
Beyond all these differences, it is possible to single out some common features of the policies of immigration, citizenship and lifestyle that several European countries are considering. In all the aforementioned cases, the problems of immigration and of citizenship standards bring about the problem of defining the "identity" of a nation.
In fact, whether we believe that newcomers need to know the hosting country"s values, or that everybody should agree on some basic common values, however we must address the following problem: which are the values that characterize a given country?
This quest for state"s identity affects both immigration and citizenship policies. This is also because the concepts and the status of citizens and of immigrants tend to overlap. The right to citizenship is losing its importance in several European states because it is being gradually deprived of substantial effects. The mere residency in a state"s territories is becoming the key-factor that endows immigrants with substantial portions of rights that used to be reserved to citizens. The status of citizens and the status of immigrants tend to merge into one and therefore the problematic definition of the identity of a state touches upon the integration of immigrants as dramatically as it does with regard to the integration of new citizens.
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The purpose of this paper is precisely to highlight the difficulties in framing the debate about national identity and values. After a few remarks about the means through which several countries tend to shape their immigration policies (paragraph 1), I will try to explain how such difficulties derive: from the overwhelming universalistic approach of contemporary constitutionalism (paragraph 2); from a certain understanding of the nature and of the role of national identity as opposed to universalism (paragraph 3); from the commonly universalistic approach that the main contemporary legal traditions share (paragraph 4); and from an underestimation of national identity (paragraph 5). In the Conclusion, I will (a) discuss the belief that national identity can be enforced through policies of identity without losing its distinct features and (b) propose a different reading of national traditions.
Immigrants, human rights and culture
The first common feature of all the attempts to address such issues comes from their rationale:
making noncitizens good citizens -in other words, people with whom citizens can peacefully and fruitfully coexist. This rationale can be found also in legal systems that foster a change in the citizens" mindset: this change is needed precisely -or mainly -because of the arrival of strangers with different cultural backgrounds.
Generally, it is believed that noncitizens who come to European countries need to meet certain standards, in order to settle and, prospectively, get citizenship. Sometimes they are -more or less closely -evaluated, sometimes they aren"t. For instance, immigrants who apply for permanent residency permit in France now have to prove a sufficient knowledge of the French language. 17 Or, in Switzerland, until recently some Cantons" Parliaments -which still have the power to concede or to deny citizenship -could accord citizenship basically deciding on a case-by-case basis. 18 Obviously, also here one can find several differences. In some countries, the integration policies focus on the immigrants" capabilities to interact with others or to understand the country"s lifestyle they are joining, such as language skills. In other countries, the evaluations are less punctual and cover a broader spectrum of skills, personal commitments and cultural background of those applying for citizenship.
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The diverse national perspectives converge, however, in a second aspect: namely, they tend to depict newcomers -at least -as partially different from the people who have been living in the host countries for generations. They assume that there is a gap between the new or prospective citizens on one hand, and the citizens whose roots are well embedded in the national culture and lifestyle, on the other hand. The contemporary models of immigrants" integration share the view that that gap must be filled, at least partially, by the institutions and the law.
It is interesting to notice that the different countries" attempts to address the cultural gap between newcomers and citizens overlap on a third point: the universal rights they put at the center of their integration and citizenship programs. This is the aspect I am investigating more deeply now.
Contemporary constitutionalism and neutral patriotism
The distinctions from other countries depending on which human rights they enforce and on how they enforce them.
This is -at least partially -true also with reference to states that tend to enforce a clearer "identitarian approach," which stresses the role of history and the common heritage of a nation (say France, or Italy). This approach aims at assimilating newcomers into the national culture. But its focus on national identity is still mostly concerned with the illiberal and anti-humanitarian practices of immigrants -practices that are believed to degrade human dignity and therefore to be contrary to basic human rights, rather than to a given national culture. Although such states stress their "identitarian approach," they are actually focusing on fundamental human rights that they feel to be intensely linked with their collective history.
Therefore, states produce texts, documents and reflections that are intended to provide immigrants with a standardized imagery and lifestyle, which can differ in details, but is the same in its core values. What many European states produce is a list of basic rights that are common throughout civilized societies. In so doing, the countries that stress the centrality of some basic rights miss the target of their policies: they don"t provide immigrants with a clear picture of themselves, but rather
give them the basics of human rights, while they confine their specific features to a secondary role.
This is actually the failure of the project of making immigrants and new citizens committed as much as possible to the life of the country that hosts them. There is no reason to believe they will feel attached to a specific country, since this country is described in very general terms, as enforcing basic rights that the country believes should be enforced everywhere. Admittedly, the more a human right is universal, the more understandable it is to expect immigrants to respect it. Nevertheless, the more a right is universal, and praised for being universal, the harder it becomes for immigrants to feel attached to the country they are living in. 
Enforcing universal human rights on a local level
As we saw, the universality of rights is not good enough to strengthen the relationship between citizens, immigrants and national institutions. Sometimes it can even widen the gap between the people and the national institutions diverge, since the people are expected to grasp more universal and abstract values than the practices of their own country. A good citizen turns to be a citizen who cares more of human rights than the nation he is living in.
This phenomenon is indebted with the practice of expressing the values of a country with the language of rights. Rights are believed to be the pillars upon which a society is built, and this prompts the universalistic tendency of states" identitarian policies.
The longstanding tradition of rights culture has made it difficult to express national cultures without using human rights language and, more precisely, with a universal human rights one. Of course, there are aspects of any country that can be described in non-human rights terms: one can say that
Italians love soccer and food; French people are proud of their history and of their old cities;
Spaniards love Flamenco music and keep the practice of killing bulls for fun; Britons are commonly portrayed as preserving an aristocratic lifestyle, such as the fox hunting sport. But it is not by chance that one does not expect immigrants and citizens to share these quite common practices and ideals. One can expect Italians to be very selective in the way they choose restaurants; one can hardly impose this practice on new Italians or on prospective Italians.
After all, it seems that rights can be enforced, but that they are detached from a country; on the contrary, culture is believed to be geographically and socially situated, but it is hardly enforced.
The common recourse to human or universal rights shows another interesting aspect of the understanding of a state"s dignity. In relying on human rights so heavily, European countries believe that what they care most about is what they would spread throughout the world: that such rights are so fundamental in themselves, regardless of the country that forged or introduced them, that all countries should protect and enforce them. The esteem that is accorded human rights makes their value so high that they are believed to be universally valid.
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Of course this doesn"t help to define the identity of a country. It confirms that the same human rights" ideology that characterizes contemporary European states blurs the states" identities, precisely in the name of the ideals they are committed to. The more a state is committed to human rights, the more its aspiration is universal and the less defined needs to be its identity.
The idea that the dignity of a political community is effectively expressed through a catalogue of rights, and that these rights are intrinsically universal, has been successfully replicated through the federalizing process in several states.
In fact, this attention to human rights is also a common feature of the most recent trends in federalism and decentralization processes. It can be found in the United States, too, even if this country is characterized by a federalist structure that dates back to the end of the Eighteenth century. Notoriously, one of the contemporary readings of American federalism parallels states and Federation in promoting human rights: according to this reading, the states have a dignity because they can compete with the federation in broadening the list of rights that are enforced, and because they can push the federation to enforce such rights. 27 If this reading is correct -and I will not investigate its correctness here -states are endowed with a specific dignity because they promote rights that can become universal. After all, even American states are believed to enforce universal rights.
A similar attitude can be found in a strand of the recent Italian federalizing process, as I will show in the following paragraph.
The human rights' standard model: an Italian example
During the recent Italian federalizing process, which was initiated by two constitutional reforms in regions have no role in according or denying citizenship or residency permits, they are believed to represent important leverage points for the construction of a shared political community, following a bottom-up logic.
The values and rights that are included in the regional statutes should characterize the regional collective identities: they should reflect the sensibility and the character of the people who live in the regions, and represent the framework for the integration of newcomers. After all, if the statutes were all equal, they would simply repeat a standardized national identity -and therefore, there would be no reason to replicate the constitutional provisions.
Interestingly, the statutes that have been delivered express their commitment to universal rights and their intentions to align their policies to the contemporary trends of human rights discourse extensively. 30 In short, they use a globalized language to express a globalized commitment: the respect of human rights. They obviously diverge in the way they express their commitment, and in the number of rights they enlist. But they all find their legitimization in the protection and enforcement of human rights on a global basis.
The universal human rights discourse has been spreading throughout the different levels of government, regardless of the powers each level is endowed with. We can therefore investigate the reasons for such a frequent interest in human rights.
Why the states focus on human rights: competing universalisms
The spread of human rights is well embedded in the belief that human rights should be universally enforced, since they are universally valid. It is not necessary to delve into this aspect; it will suffice to recall that the debate around human rights has been dominated by the preoccupation that human rights are universally enforced. The aspects of the legal traditions that aren"t supposed to characterize all of mankind are usually left in the penumbra, unless they are disregarded as suspicious concepts, carrying a neo-nationalistic concept of statehood, which would be quite close to the ideologies that tragically characterized
Europe mostly in the first half of the twentieth century. 35 It will suffice to highlight this aspect in some of the main European doctrines that have dealt with human rights.
The utilization of modern Natural Law theory usually confines the territorial specificities to the field of determinatio, which is left to local political communities and is not relevant to the theory itself.
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The The Catholic theory of human rights, common good 40 and subsidiarity, which calls on larger political bodies to act after that smaller ones have proved to be unable to solve problems, logically assumes that all the political bodies -from the local ones to the global ones -are concerned with the same public interests and with the respect of the same rights.
In all of the aforementioned traditions, the focus is not on the specificities of each political body, but rather on the sameness of rights that should be enforced. It is therefore completely understandable that the states tend to legitimize themselves through the adoption and the enforcement of universal rights: the major legal traditions, through which they are commonly politically, legally and culturally measured, focus on them.
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All of these legal traditions acknowledge that human rights retain a moral meaning, 42 and therefore express the value of a state. This aspect illuminates why, on the overall, human rights are used to rank the states: a state"s degree of human rights" enforcement mirrors the state"s dignity. Ranking a state"s human rights protection is ranking a state"s dignity.
The importance of conceiving human rights as universal has also a second explanation: in stressing their commitment to universal rights, the states tend to ground their value on an objective basis: the fact that human rights are, or should be, universally respected and enforced, roots the state"s legitimization and identity on solid grounds -grounds that are universally recognized. 43 The commitment to human rights endows the state with a presumptively absolute meaning and value, which a state could never achieve if it focused on merely domestic values.
But the very fact that states measure themselves with the protection of universal human rights leaves us with two unsolved problems. In addressing the topic of national identity, the first problem we are left with is that states and local bodies, such as regions, do not seem to simply legitimize themselves through the universal human rights discourse; they rather identify their own value with it. Obviously, there are differences between the French, the Italian or the Spanish conceptions of human rights; but they all claim that they enforce the human rights that need to be respected; and that how they enforce them is exactly the proper way to do it. This can be said as a logical consequence of conceiving the rights being enforced as universal.
Legitimization and identity
Even if the differences among the states do exist, the states don"t declare that such differences are distinctive features of their own identities. In fact, even if they diverge sometimes in how they enforce rights, their affirmations about the way they enforce rights are as universalistic as the purposes that they have. A state is unlikely to distinguish itself from another state on the basis of which human rights it enforces, or how it enforces them. A state will rather deny a right the qualification as human right, rather than maintaining that it exists but doesn"t deserve any constitutional protection.
Therefore, states can be distinguished one from another by the level of human rights protection they accord to their population -but this can be done only from the outside, not from the inside. An observer can draw distinctions based on which rights are enforced by each state and by which means. But we cannot expect that states rank their own commitment to human rights as an aspect of their identity: all the states will rank themselves #1 -at least in their auspices and hopes of enforcing human rights.
We are therefore left with the first delusive conclusion: a state"s core identity is supposed to coincide with the rights that the states enforces -but the rights are supposed to be largely the same throughout the world, as we saw before. This is true also with regard to the broader European perspective. The insistence on universal human rights is not a mere insistence on the human rights framework that would characterize the 45 The fact that the ECtHR looks outside Europe to integrate its readings of the European Convention demonstrates its Universalist approach.
The ECtHR"s understanding of human rights as being universal is paralleled by state courts, which don"t confine the comparative work to other European states, but look at least in North America and, specially, in the United States and in Canada. 46 For instance, some scholars speak about an emerging model of Commonwealth constitutionalism, 47 which includes common law regimes and in which the UK has an active as well as a passive role, since it draws inspiration from common law regimes of other continents.
Finally, the European legal doctrine has highlighted the deep convergence of civilized states of the world, in which the protection of human rights is expected to be particularly high, and defined this convergence as one of the most adequate tools that should help judges in interpreting their own domestic constitutional texts. 48 To put it shortly, it seems clear that a vast and authoritative portion of European doctrine thinks globally, not continentally. 
The religion of human rights
The second major shortcoming in this conception of state"s identity as expressed by human rights on a universal basis derives from the relationship between human rights and national traditions.
Admittedly, national religious and cultural traditions have recently come to play a new role in shaping the contemporary identity of the states: they have been considered in their connections with modern human rights, rather than as opposed to them. They have been said to be the crucible out of which contemporary human rights were born, and therefore they have been restored in their historical dignity, at least partially. 50 The prominent German law scholar Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde put it in famous terms: "The liberal secular state lives on premises that it is not able to guarantee by itself. On one hand it can subsist only if the freedom it consents to its citizens is regulated from within, inside the moral substance of individuals and of a homogeneous society. On the other hand, it is not able to guarantee these forces of inner regulation by itself without renouncing its liberalism." 51 Similarly, Robert M. Carver, notoriously drawing a distinction between nomos and narrative in political societies, maintained that the universalistic human rights approach is a "weak" infrastructure, which comes after and cannot really supplant "worlds of strong normative meaning;" such worlds of strong normative meaning would be able to build up new law and political system thanks to their religious inspiration and structure. 52 According to scholars such as Carver, then, religious traditions frame political societies, whereas legal systems enforce them.
Both Böckenförde and Carver have acknowledged that states rely on their religious and cultural traditions as sources of public morality and stimulus for the commitment to human rights. Also in this context, we can see that religious and cultural traditions are considered as meaningful tools to enhance human rights. 54 They are put at the core of the public life, but in the name of human rights: we should cultivate our traditions and religions -the reasoning goes -because this helps cultivating human rights. The focus is still on human rights, rather than on the sources of a national human rights" culture.
It is not by chance, then, that the reconsideration of national traditions has been paralleled by a relevant gradualist theory of constitutionalism, according to which traditions matter as historical human rights" diving-boards. Traditions are relevant for their outcome, rather than in themselves.
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They matter because they can make good citizens: because they are useful in "making men legal," through "making [them] moral." 56 Therefore, they may well disappear, since it is their outcomethe human rights -what really matters. What immigrants should embrace are still universal human rights, whereas they need only to recognize the historical value of national cultures.
Returning to the examination of the quest of a state"s identity as a device to integrate newcomers, this portrait of tradition does not really define the core of a country. It can be used retrospectively, in order to portray the long way that a country has come, but it isn"t necessary to describe its fundamental values, which consist of human rights.
After all, if traditions are used in this way, they are treated as mere human rights" roots and therefore underestimated in their value and, at the same time, they don"t really capture a state"s identity, which is to be found primarily in human rights.
Conclusion (and Introduction for a new research topic)
We have seen that several European states find it difficult to describe their own identity without identifying themselves with human rights standards, which are global in their inspiration. The more the states stress the importance of human rights, the less important they become.
What states propose and eventually request from immigrants differ from state to state, but the final goal is usually the same: that they join the universal commitment to human rights. The same attachment of immigrants to the state they join should be justified with the state"s commitment to the enforcement and implementation of human rights.
As we saw, stressing human rights" relevance has a reason. In fact, this finds its rationale in the moral substance of human rights. Nevertheless, this makes the state"s identity anonymous: the history and the specific features of a State aren"t relevant; or, they are relevant only insofar as they have historically and culturally led to the shaping of human rights.
If the identity of a state is expressed with the language of hopefully universally protected human rights, the only distinction that can be made among the states depends on the list of human rights they respect and on the way they protect them. But this comparison can be made from the outside, rather from the inside. States do not affirm that they are enforcing less human rights than others; they will be more inclined to disregard the rights they don"t enforce as not being human rights.
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The laws and the manifestos that have been introduced in order to depict the identity of the states have sometimes ignored, and sometimes included the religious and cultural traditions of the states in their discourse. Nevertheless, both the perspectives have largely considered their traditions in the light of the human rights they have contributed to shape. Traditions have been considered as human rights" historical antecedents and engines. This inclines to the conclusion that it is possible to single out human rights from their crucible.
The conclusion about the possibilities of highlighting states" identities as a useful means to introduce immigrants into European political societies is largely delusive. This is because of (a) the universal vocation of contemporary European states, as well as because of (b) the human rights" discourse, which has monopolized moral politics. States obviously differ in the rights they enforce and in how they enforce them, but, since they are all committed to human rights" enforcement, they are reluctant to declare their specificities as specificities. Finally, (c) the same European religiousoverwhelmingly Christian -traditions, as captured by legal doctrines, have contributed to the fading of the European states" identities, since they have highlighted the universal character of human rights. 58 Nevertheless, the failure in trying to describe a state"s identity something specific, without relying heavily on universal human rights is not necessarily a failure in itself. It can derive from different factors, and lead to significant conclusions.
The first plausible reason is that traditions are conceptually integrated with the fundamental rights and liberties they embed and culturally express. They are as universal as human rights, since they express how a country understands human rights and believes human rights should be enforced.
This means that universal human rights aren"t necessarily opposed to particular traditions and identities: both can have a universal vocation. 59 Identities surely have a particular origin, but can have a universal vocation. 60 The second plausible reason that could explain the failure to describe a national identity in legal terms might derive from the simple fact that identity cannot be defined through law. It can be described, but not prescribed. A tradition can be enforced and transformed into law, but its distinctive feature lies outside and before the law: it lies in the society that has shaped that collective identity. 61 If Weiler is right, a country"s attitude towards the preservation of the national identity through the generations -which would amount to a traditionwould be better described in terms of a collective proposal that grows through generations and can be embraced freely by newcomers as well as by native-born new generations, rather than in mere legal terms. 62 This reading implies that traditions nurture the quest for universal rights. Human rights protection as well as human rights progress is therefore strictly related to traditions. Traditions have shaped human rights and still preserve their character of proposal, which is made by a collective body to individuals as well as to collectivities. Alasdair MacIntyre has maintained that "To be outside all traditions is to be a stranger to enquiry," 63 and this affirmation can be applied also to human rights enquiry. In other words, the implementations of human rights can"t be severed from the community that makes such efforts. The enquiry would be "tradition-constituted" as well as "traditionconstitutive." 64 The third plausible reason for reconsidering the relationship between tradition and law is that traditional customs or cultures don"t stand still is that they evolve. 65 They are subject to variation, endorsement or opposition throughout the generations. 66 And when they change for the better, it is not necessarily because they depart from their origin and align themselves to universal standards, but also because they improve the understanding of their own values. 67 Since traditions change, they cannot be preserved through the law as traditions. Tradition can rather be preserved by the people, 68 which can decide to keep or dismiss practices and customs. Each generation -a concept that includes immigrants who settle in a country indefinitely -is confronted by the same issues, and can decide to give them different solutions.
The universalistic approach and the traditional approach aren"t really alternative ways to conceive a country"s identity. Tradition includes in the debate and in the understanding of a country"s universal aspirations to human rights" protection, the rationales that back such aspirations, and the ways through which these aspirations are pursued. Moreover, such reading of universalism and tradition recognizes that both rationales and ways of enforcing human rights are affected by the history, the culture and the religion of the people that have been shaping them for centuries. In these two considerations lies the traditional element of democracies as well as the democratic element of traditions. The first tells us that democratic debates include previous generations" thinking, cultures and values; the second reminds us that people, including newcomers, don"t simply receive human rights, but they also contribute to their conception and reconsideration actively, since traditions interact openly in shaping a common narrative of rights and duties. 74 Mr.
Riccardi was therefore right when he said that it is necessary that immigrants share their lives with natives: this is the best way they can learn their rights and duties, and even improve them.
Conclusively, tradition -and what the states are really looking for when they talk about national identity -can be enforced as law; but it cannot be enforced as tradition. Tradition qua tradition and identity can only be shared within the society. If immigrants need to know how the society they are joining lives, they shouldn"t ask the law; they should rather ask the people. And, if a people want immigrants to know how they live, they cannot simply defer this educative role to the law.
Still, a major work appears still to be done. The Universalist language of human rights needs to be reframed, in order to preserve it as well as in order to give a role to particularism and to state identity.
The universalism as portrayed in this paper is doubly delusive: first, it doesn"t help in defining state identities; on the contrary, it deprives the debate about state identity of any substantial role. Second, this universalism has become largely tautological: the states maintain that they enforce human rights properly -or, at least, that they know how they should do it. Therefore, no state would agree in being ranked other than #1, in a list of states based on the degree of protection that they accord to human rights or on how much they strive in order to protect them.
Three aspects need to be addressed properly, in order to reshape the debate about states" identity and about its relationship with universal human rights. 78 For what we have seen so far, we can conclude that it is the particular that embeds universalism.
Particularism can be said to incorporate and embed universalism, in a double sense: because particular traditions develop standpoints that have a Universalist vocation and claim, 79 as well as because it is within particular societies 80 that one discovers, learns, practices and protects human rights. 81 Second, the observation that human rights are normally learned, shaped and even practiced at a local level leads us back to Chesterton"s reflections about traditions, as well as to MacIntyre contribution to the understanding of virtues. 82 Chesterton is not thinking about laws but rather about customs and daily practices. Local identities tend to incorporate a rule, as well as the belief that that rule is just, and the enactment of that rule. 83 The experience of law at a local level is therefore thicker than the experience of law at a universal, more abstract level: it encompasses not just statute law provisions or case-law judgments, but also not-written and implicit practices that may well lie under the surface of collectivities, but are so fundamental that don"t even need to be written or explicitly declared.
The local level bears an understanding of law that is deeper and broader than what one can meet when focusing on a universal level. Therefore, it may take longer and stronger efforts to detect the local understanding of universal human rights: this is why the somehow similar idea of incorporating practices and customs in a cosmopolitanism of human rights 84 is more demanding than simply focusing on texts and judicial decisions. Nevertheless, such fatigues are more effective and responsive to the quest for a true human rights" Universalism: human rights" enforcement succeeds precisely when human rights are adopted and practiced on a daily basis, at the local level.
Third, since traditions aren"t just dive-boards for human rights, but have been and still are the intellectual engines for human rights" reflection and implementation, then the real novelty that the last decades have brought us consists in the close coexistence of different traditions, which compete as well as collaborate in conceiving and protecting human rights in a globalized world, where free market and circulation of people and goods have become so common. 85 It is the presence of different collective identities, which use different languages, even within Europe, that poses the strongest challenges. But this cannot be simply addressed through the separation between tradition and law; this would detach the law and the legal change from their very engine. On the contrary, it would be good to consider if, on a narrower scale -as the European continent, or within a single state -new traditions have appeared, even through the hybridization of pre-existing traditions. 86 The implementation of human rights wouldn"t derive from an abstraction of historical traditions, but from the very life of local collectivities, which may have come to incorporate new and different perspectives on law, society and life.
Traditions can change, in their results as well as in the elements that compose them. 87 In this regard, they are not to be confused with conservatism, which normally aims at stabilizing the composition as well as the outcome of intellectual and cultural reflections. 88 Actually, the "tradition-constituted" understanding of human rights suggests that immigrants and new comers don"t simply join a tradition, but rather contribute to its success and its vitality. And that this success is attainable because traditions are more dynamic -and unpredictable -that what we usually believe. 89 They are so unpredictable that the attempt to lead them to some targeted goals is perceived as fake and a betrayal of the sense of a tradition. 90 This is why the initiatives that push for a creation of, say, some
European Islam, even driving the interpretation of Islamic thought towards foreordained conclusions, are largely taken as religious highjacks. 91 
